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Jury Size and the Hung-Jury Paradox
Barbara Luppi and Francesco Parisi

A B ST R A CT

In Williams v. Florida (399 U.S. 78 [1970]), the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case addressing
the constitutionality of juries composed of fewer than 12 jurors, ruling that smaller juries are
not inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment. In an effort to speed deliberation and reduce
the rate of mistrials, 11 states have subsequently adopted juries of fewer than 12 in state
felony trials, and 40 states have diminished their jury sizes for state misdemeanor trials.
Curiously, however, contrary to the predictions of probability theory and common sense, these
reductions in jury sizes have failed to deliver the expected reduction in mistrial rates. In this
paper, we offer two interrelated explanations for this fact: informational cascades and the
heterogeneity of jurors.

The 12-person jury is a timeworn institution; a staple of novels, stage,
and cinema; and well established in the common-law tradition, the historical tendrils of which extend from the medieval courts of England.
From as far back as the twelfth century, trials were decided by juries of
12, a number that by the fourteenth century had become so firmly ceBARBARA LUPPI is Assistant Professor in Political Economics, University of Modena and
Reggio Emilia, and Visiting Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
FRANCESCO PARISI is Oppenheimer Wolff and Donnelly Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School, and Professor of Economics, University of Bologna. An early incarnation of this idea developed in 1999 during conversations with Cass Sunstein after a
presentation on group polarization. The idea remained dormant for more than a decade.
We would like to thank our colleague and friend Davide Ferrari for having worked through
the formulation of this problem. His generous contributions to the model would warrant
full coauthorship. We would also like to thank Daniel Pi for his valuable research and
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mented in the legal tradition that it subsequently acquired near mystical
significance. The 12-person jury later made its way to the American
colonies and persisted after the Revolution as a constitutional right in
the United States.
However, after more than 6 centuries without challenge, jury trials have
recently undergone several substantial transformations, including notably a
reevaluation of jury size. Policy makers have grown increasingly concerned
with the cost of hung juries,1 which has led to the lowering of minimum
jury sizes in a majority of states. The intuition motivating the reduction in
jury size is that smaller juries are less likely to contain outliers who might
obstruct convergence around a unanimous verdict.
In this paper, we discover the counterintuitive result that in the presence
of informational cascades, reductions in jury size may increase the probability of hung juries. In Section 1, we explore the legal background and
review the existing law and economics literature on jury deliberation. In
Section 2, we consider how accuracy and decisiveness in jury deliberation
change when the process is subject to informational cascades. In Section
3, we analyze the results of our model, describe situations in which unanimous verdicts are more easily reached, and show that under certain conditions unanimity may be more easily reached by large groups than by
small groups. We refer to this counterintuitive result as the “hung-jury
paradox.” We also consider the effects of heterogeneity and the interaction
between heterogeneity and jury size on jury deliberation. We conclude in
Section 4 with some policy recommendations and suggestions for future
research.
1 . T H E R I S E A N D FA L L O F T H E 1 2 - P E R S O N J U R Y: B A C K G R O U N D A N D R EV I EW
O F T H E L I TE R ATU R E

The framers of the U.S. Constitution viewed the right to a jury trial as
a fundamental pillar of liberty—a form of protection against the threat
1. When a jury cannot reach consensus on a given verdict after an extended period of deliberation, the jury is said to be hung or deadlocked. In most jurisdictions, a hung jury results in
a mistrial, after which the case may be retried by the prosecution, thereby resulting in duplicative
and wasteful efforts by both parties. Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
“If the jury cannot agree on a verdict on one or more counts, the court may declare a mistrial
on those counts. A hung jury does not imply either the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The
government may retry any defendant on any count on which the jury could not agree.” In
practice, only a small percentage of cases that end in mistrial are retried. Thus, from a defendant’s
perspective, a mistrial is often regarded as the practical equivalent of an acquittal. For an extensive
and general discussion of American juries, see Kalven and Zeisel (1966).
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of judicial tyranny. Defendants in criminal trials were therefore guaranteed the right to a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution. In the leading 1898 case Thompson v. Utah (170 U.S. 343,
349 [1898]) the U.S. Supreme Court construed the Sixth Amendment
to require that in all criminal cases “a jury [be] comprised of 12 persons,
neither more nor less.”2
However, in Williams v. Florida (399 U.S. 78 [1970]), the Court
reconsidered its earlier stance, overturning Thompson. The defendant in
Williams argued that the trial court’s rejection of a motion to impanel
a 12-person jury was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment (the
trial was decided by a jury of six),3 which guarantees the criminally
accused the right to “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed.” Williams argued that implicit in
the right was that the jury comprise 12 jurors. The Court rejected Williams’s argument, reasoning that the language and legislative history of
the Constitution contained no explicit reference to jury size. Instead, the
Court held that the test of the constitutionality of jury size was whether
a reduction would undermine the jury’s essential function: grounding
the judicial process in the common-sense judgment of the community.
While recognizing the historical imprimatur of the 12-person-jury requirement, the Court repudiated the mystical connotations associated
with the number 12, declaring the traditional jury size a “historical
accident unrelated to the great purposes which gave rise to the jury in
the first place” (Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 89). In particular, the ruling
in Williams v. Florida upheld the validity of the six-person jury’s verdict
convicting defendant Williams, establishing that even a jury of six could
satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. This ruling gave state
courts the freedom to vary the size of juries in felony and misdemeanor
criminal cases. The decision triggered an uproar, but the principle that
the Constitution does not require 12-member juries in all cases was
upheld in subsequent decisions and remains good law.4
In Ballew v. Georgia (435 U.S. 223 [1978]), the Court set a lower
limit on jury size, perhaps anticipating the consequence of Williams
2. Miller (1998) provides a thorough historical analysis of the rise and fall of the 12person jury in the United States.
3. The High Court of Australia rejected an analogous claim, that the constitutional right
to a trial by jury (Australian Constitution, c. 3, sec. 80) required a jury of 12, in Brownlee
v. The Queen (207 CLR 278 [2001]).
4. In a series of cases beginning in 1970, the Court reaffirmed the principle in Williams
that the federal Constitution does not require 12-member juries in all cases.
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taken to the extreme, holding that any number less than six would be
unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that such a jury would be too
small to be representative of the relevant community.5 Although federal
courts continue to use juries composed of 12 members voting unanimously (Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 23[b]),6 in criminal cases the vast majority
of trials are heard in state courts, which now often use juries of fewer
than 12.
A total of 11 states currently use juries composed of fewer than 12
jurors in felony and misdemeanor trials (see Table 1; Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2004). An additional 29 states allow juries of fewer than 12
in misdemeanor cases (see Table A1; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004).7
This brings the number of states that allow smaller juries in some criminal cases to 40.
Unsurprisingly, adopting smaller jury sizes alters the dynamics of jury
deliberation. Scholars and policy makers anticipated that the use of
smaller juries would reduce the cost of trials and decrease mistrial rates.
As we discuss in detail in Section 3.1, according to probability theory,
the probability of a trial resulting in a hung jury should decrease from
the historic average of 5.5 percent for a jury of 12 to an expected average
of 2.1 percent. However, statistics indicate that overall mistrial rates
have remained fairly steady. A comparison of the rates reported by Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002) shows no decrease—indeed, there was actually an increase from 5.5 to 6.2 percent—in hung-jury rates in state criminal courts, comparing the years
1955–58 (when 12-person juries were uniformly adopted) and 1980–98
(after most states had adopted smaller juries). A handful of empirical
5. Soon afterward, in Burch v. Louisiana (441 U.S. 130 [1979]), the Court further
elaborated that states cannot allow six-person juries to deliver nonunanimous verdicts in
criminal cases. See Neilson and Winter (2005) for an analysis of nonunanimity and verdict
accuracy.
6. The requirement of unanimity for verdicts leading to criminal convictions has generally been viewed as an important feature of criminal trials. Unanimity is meant to preserve
the public’s confidence in the criminal justice system by imposing the highest standard of
persuasion for conviction. Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
verdicts to be unanimous in criminal cases. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that nonunanimous verdicts do not violate the Constitution (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 [1968];
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 [1972]; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 [1972]).
This finding gave states the flexibility to allow nonunanimous verdicts. Only two states,
Louisiana and Oregon, have exercised this new possibility and currently allow nonunanimous verdicts in felony cases, while one state (Oklahoma) allows them in misdemeanor
cases. Nonunanimous verdicts are not allowed when smaller juries are used, as per Burch
v. Louisiana.
7. Still more states allow the use of juries with fewer than 12 members in civil trials.
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Table 1. States That Reduced Jury Sizes for Felony and Misdemeanor Offenses

Jurisdiction
Arizona
Connecticut
Florida
Indiana
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Type of Case
All criminal cases except for sentences of 30 years or
more
All criminal cases but by agreement in capital cases
All criminal cases except capital cases
Cases at the county and municipal levels
By agreement
All criminal cases except when requiring confinement
or hard labor
Cases at the district and municipal levels
By agreement, except for capital cases
All criminal cases
By defendant’s choice, except for capital cases
By agreement

Jurors
8
6
6
6
!12
6
6
!12
8
!12
!12

Note. Arizona permits the use of eight-person juries except in capital cases or in cases with
a possible sentence of 30 years or more (Ariz. Const. art. 1, sec. 23). Connecticut allows the
use of six-person juries. In capital cases, the use of a six-person jury is possible only if the
defendant agrees to it (Conn. Const. art. 1, sec. 19). Florida allows six-person juries for felony
cases, except for capital cases, for which a 12-person jury is required (Fla. Stat. Ann. sec.
913.10 [West 1996]). Indiana permits six-person juries for felony cases in municipal and
county courts but not at the circuit or superior court level (Ind. Code Ann. sec. 35–37–1–1
[West 1996]). Kansas permits a jury of fewer than 12 persons for felony cases if the parties
agree in writing at any time before the verdict with the approval of the court (Kan. Stat. Ann.
sec. 22–3403 [West 2012]). Louisiana allows six-person juries but requires the use of 12person juries when sentencing requires confinement at hard labor (La. Const. art. 1, sec. 17).
Massachusetts allows six-person juries at the municipal and district court levels (Mass. Ann.
Laws, chap. 234, secs. 25–26 [Law. Co-op. 1986]). In New Jersey, both prosecutor and
defendant may agree to a jury of fewer than 12 jurors, except in capital cases (N.J. Stat. Ann.
sec. 2B:23–1[a] [West 1996]). Utah requires eight-person juries in all felony cases, including
capital cases (Utah Const. art. 1, sec. 10). Washington allows for a jury of fewer than 12
members if the defendant elects to have the case tried before a six-member jury, except in
capital cases (Wash. Const. art. 1, sec. 21, as applied by Wash. R. Court 48 [2012]). In
Wisconsin, both prosecutor and defendant may agree to a jury of fewer than 12 jurors (Wis.
Stat. Ann. 972.02[2] [West 2012]).

studies have delved somewhat deeper in attempting to evaluate how jury
size affects trial results. Most also conclude that there are no detectable
differences between six-person and 12-person juries with respect to mistrial rates. Early studies include Institute of Judicial Administration
(1972), Bermant and Coppock (1973), Kessler (1973), Mills (1973),
Zeisel and Diamond (1974), Davis et al. (1975), Lempert (1975), Valenti
and Downing (1975), Buckhout et al. (1977), and Padawer-Singer,
Singer, and Singer (1977).8 Black (1979, p. 1114) concluded in his review
8. For a complete review of the literature, see also Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington
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of the empirical literature that “there are indeed no verdict differences
between six- and twelve-member juries.” Roper (1980) identifies a
slightly higher incidence of hung juries in 12-person mock juries (than
in six-person mock juries), but the result is not statistically significant.9
More recent studies, including Kerr and MacCoun (1985), Saks and
Marti (1997), Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002), and Eisenberg et al. (2005),
also fail to uncover any significant differences in hung-jury rates, when
comparing six-person and 12-person juries.10 These findings beg the
question—the hung-jury paradox—why the widespread reductions in
jury size from 12 to six failed to reduce mistrial rates, contrary to the
predictions of probability theory.
The empirical findings of Davis et al. (1975), Grofman (1976), Tanford and Penrod (1983), and Myers and Lamm (1976) hint at a possible
explanation: larger juries sometimes exacerbate the effects of jury polarization during deliberation. We build on that intuition and explore
the extent to which jury polarization can explain the hung-jury paradox.
We find that polarization through informational cascades may offset the
effects of large jury size and reduce the gap between the hung-jury rates
of small and large juries.
To aid our effort, we draw from (and build on) the existing political
economy literature to resolve the discrepancy between the theoretical
predictions and the empirical observations of the jury size effects. According to the Condorcet ([1785] 1976) theorem, if individual jurors
have a greater than 50 percent chance of being correct, increasing the
number of voters increases the probability that the majority decision
(1983), who similarly report no statistically significant difference in hung-jury rates between
six-person and 12-person juries under a unanimity rule. In addition, empirical evidence
provides support for the existence of effects of jury size on participation rates, length of
deliberations, and recall of evidence. Jury representativeness may worsen significantly because a reduction of jury size has an adverse effect on jury representativeness (see Lempert
1975).
9. The only empirical evidence revealing some difference between different-sized juries
looks at jury verdicts under a setting that allows for nonunanimous verdicts. Zeisel (1971)
reports a hung-jury rate of 2.4 percent in a sample of 290 six-person criminal juries, slightly
lower than the 5 percent rate observed in his national sample of 12-person juries. Still with
reference to nonunanimous verdicts, Padawer-Singer, Singer, and Singer (1977) report a
hung-jury rate of 8.7 percent for six-person mock juries and of 21.7 percent for 12-person
groups. These findings have little practical relevance after the decision of Burch v. Louisiana,
which prohibits convictions with nonunanimous verdicts by juries composed of fewer than
12 jurors.
10. The data reported by Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002, p. 25) show no difference in
hung-jury rates between the three courts belonging to jurisdictions adopting six-person
juries and the 27 jurisdictions adopting 12-person juries.
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will be correct. One aim of our investigation is to develop a simple
model to analyze how the presence of herding behavior may affect the
well-known results of Condorcet’s jury theorem.
2 . T H E M O D EL

Consider a jury of n individuals making a binary choice, Xi 苸 {0, 1},
i p 1, . . . , n, such that 1 represents the correct decision and 0 is the
incorrect alternative, and let Sn p X1 ⫹ … ⫹ Xn. Let pi p P(Xi p 1),
i p 1, . . . , n, denote the probability that the ith juror decides correctly,
and let P(n) p P(Sn p n) denote the probability that the jury unanimously reaches the correct decision. In addition, let us denote the probability of a correct decision for the ith juror as E[Xi ] p pi.
The possible presence of informational cascades violates the independence assumption, and therefore Condorcet’s theorem might not hold
even in cases in which the jury choice involves only two alternatives.
This is because Condorcet’s theorem rests crucially on the assumption
that individual jurors’ erroneous decisions do not affect the decisions of
other members of the jury. With independence, each juror will always
express the same judgment, regardless of the opinions expressed by other
jurors and regardless of the order in which those opinions are expressed.11 By contrast, cascade behavior occurs in situations where people act sequentially and allow other people’s choices to influence their
decision making.12 The putative purpose of jury deliberation is to allow
jurors to exchange views and reconsider their prior beliefs in light of
the perspectives expressed by others. It is difficult to imagine any such
deliberation process free from sequential decision making; jurors cannot
talk simultaneously, and the opinion of one juror will necessarily have
to be expressed before or after the opinion of another juror. Thus, the
necessary temporal structure of jury deliberation may undermine independent decision making. According to Sunstein (2004, p. 17), cascade
behavior principally takes two forms: “[G]roup members tend to become
far more confident of their judgments after they speak with one another.
A significant effect of group interactions is a greater sense that one postdeliberation conclusion is correct—whether or not it actually is. Corroboration by others increases confidence in one’s judgments. It follows
11. This hypothesis is usually called independence in probability of the individual judgments (or independence of the judgment errors).
12. Consider, for example, the choice of a restaurant made on the basis of the restaurant’s
popularity or a voting decision based on opinion polls.
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that members of deliberating groups will usually converge on a position
on which members have a great deal of confidence.”
We model informational cascades in a simplified way, capturing the
spirit of Banerjee (1992) and Sunstein (2005). In order to model the
described dynamics of informational cascades, we introduce the parameter ai, which measures juror i’s confidence in his own beliefs. A higher
value of ai means that juror i regards his own opinion on the case as
more accurate than one expressed by the other members in the jury. We
assume that the voters express judgments sequentially according to the
following process:
P(Xi⫹1 p 1FXi , . . . , X1) p E[Xi⫹1FXi , . . . , X1 ]

冘
i

p a i⫹1 E[Xi⫹1 ] ⫹ (1 ⫺ a i⫹1)

kp1

Xk /i,

where 0 ≤ a i ≤ 1, i 1 1, . . . , n, and a1 p 1.
Juror i ⫹ 1 will express a voting preference as a function of his beliefs,
weighted by self-confidence a i⫹1 and the mean of the votes of the i jurors
who have expressed their voting preferences prior to juror i ⫹ 1 in the
deliberation process, weighted by (1 ⫺ a i⫹1 ). Cascade behavior is captured by the evolution of the sequence of the ai parameter in the deliberation process for each juror i in the jury composed by n members. In
the presence of cascade behavior, jurors tend to assign a greater weight
to the observations of the other jurors’ voting preferences, measured by
the average jury vote given the number of jurors who have previously
expressed their decisions. Analytically, this dynamic corresponds to the
assumption of a decreasing sequence of ai, i p 1, . . . , n.
The deliberation process described by the equation models the dynamics of herding behavior and group polarization analyzed in Sunstein
and Hastie (2008). The self-confidence variable ai captures the convincibility and persuasiveness of jurors. With high values of ai, juror i is
harder to convince by others. Jurors with low values of ai will be easier
to persuade. The assumption of a decreasing sequence of ai values captures the idea that people tend to become less confident in their own
prior belief and more confident in the emerging group consensus (independent of whether the nascent consensus is correct) as the deliberation progresses and the opinions of other jurors become known. On
the other side, the role of the average vote expressed by the jury implies
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a lower variance of group deliberation: jurors tend to converge to the
same vote as the deliberation process unfolds.13
Informational cascades play a role in jury decisions because the use
of others’ voting preferences makes each person’s decision less responsive
to her own information and hence less informative to others. The contamination dynamics of the jury deliberation process captures the essence
of the problem discussed by Sunstein and Hastie (2008, p. 4), according
to which the convergence of the group “is not disturbing if that position
is also likely to be correct—but if it is not, then many group members
will end up sharing a view in which they firmly believe, but which turns
out to be wrong (a most unfortunate and sometimes quite destructive
situation).”
It should be noted that informational cascades are a special case of
dependent or correlated decisions in jury decision making. Ladha (1992)
extends the Condorcet jury theorem to allow for correlated votes. Ladha
(1992) points out that under a majority voting rule, the Condorcet jury
theorem holds when the jury is sufficiently large and/or the correlation
between votes is not excessively high, while it fails for small juries and
highly correlated voting. The maximum level of correlation that can be
sustained without undermining the results of the Condorcet jury theorem
increases with jury size. However, whereas Ladha (1992) focuses on
majority voting, our analysis considers the effect of correlated voting
under a unanimity rule.14
3 . M A IN R E S U LT S

Here we first consider the effects of jury size and the effects of informational cascades on jury deliberation. We then consider the interaction
between heterogeneity and jury size in the presence of informational
cascades.
13. Note that the deliberation process modeled here does not include the discussion by
the jury prior to the deliberation. The model is compatible with jurors discussing their
opinions openly in one or subsequent rounds of exchanged opinions. Here we model only
the final round, in which jurors express sequentially their votes during their voting procedure to reach unanimity.
14. Other authors have investigated dependence patterns in jury (or organizational)
decision making from different perspectives. Nitzan and Paroush (1984) develop an analysis
of optimal jury decision making in the presence of correlated votes and identify the optimal
decision rule as that which maximizes the probability of reaching the correct verdict. BenYashar and Nitzan (2001) characterize the relationship between the optimal decision rule
and jury size in the presence of correlated votes.
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3.1. Hung-Jury Paradox: The Role of Informational Cascades

In theory, mistrials should arise more frequently with larger juries than
with smaller juries. However, in the presence of informational cascades,
the effect of jury size on the probability of hung juries may be reduced
or even reversed. This implies that unanimous deliberations may just as
easily be achieved in larger groups as in smaller ones. This could explain
the paradoxical empirical evidence, that jurisdictions allowing smaller
juries have not seen the anticipated reduction in the frequency of mistrials.
As per the Condorcet jury theorem, the probability of achieving a
unanimous verdict decreases with jury size, when jurors’ decisions are
independent. Consequently, the probability of a hung jury increases with
jury size.15 To illustrate, consider a jury composed of n jurors, each of
whom deliberates accurately with an error rate of 1 ⫺ p. When jurors
decide the case independently, there is no possibility of an informational
cascade. Hence, the probability of a unanimous decision, equal to p n ⫹
(1 ⫺ p)n, is decreasing in jury size, since p ! 1. The probability of mistrial
is increasing in n at a rate of p n(1 ⫺ p) ⫹ (1 ⫺ p)n p.16 Empirical studies,
including among others Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and Hannaford-Agor et
al. (2002), tell us that the probability of a hung jury is estimated to range
from 5.5 to 6.2 percent for a jury of 12.17 If we use our simple formula,
this variation implies an error rate ranging from .45 to .55 percent (that
is, each juror deliberates correctly in the range of 99.45 to 99.55 percent),
assuming independence of juror decision making. The reduction to sixperson juries should therefore result in hung juries with a probability
ranging from 2.1 to 2.8 percent. This theoretical prediction finds no support in the empirical literature. We now consider whether informational
cascades allow us to generate predictions that more closely approximate
the empirical observations.
15. Note that this is a restatement of the Condorcet jury theorem under unanimity. See
Ladha (1992) for a formal analysis.
16. For illustrative purposes and with no loss of generality, the rate of change of the
mistrial probability is calculated as the first derivative of the probability of a mistrial, under
the simplifying assumption that n is a continuous variable and approximating ln(p) with p.
17. Very few empirical studies assess the size of hung-jury rates. In the most classic study
on American juries, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) estimate a hung-jury rate of 5.5 percent in
a sample of 3,500 criminal cases. In a more recent study, Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002)
analyze hung-jury rates in federal versus state courts. While the rates in federal courts were
stable in the range of 2–3 percent, the rates in state courts were on average around 6.2
percent in the period 1980–98 and were characterized by high volatility. See also Eisenberg
et al. (2005).
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Proposition 3.1: Hung-Jury Paradox. The probability of a unanimous
verdict may increase with jury size in the presence of informational
cascades.
Proof.

See the Appendix.

Cascade behavior renders jurors’ choices correlated and makes it
easier for a jury to converge to unanimity. With informational cascades,
jurors are more prone to agree with the observed choice adopted by the
other jurors, who express their voting preferences earlier in the deliberation. In reaching a decision, values a i ( 0 introduce a drift that helps
the convergence of the decisions for all jurors in the direction of unanimity.18
A change in jury size produces two countervailing effects. The first
effect is the one identified by the Condorcet jury theorem under unanimity, according to which increasing jury size reduces the probability
of a unanimous decision. The second effect relates to the magnitude of
the cascade effect, which grows larger in n. Under certain conditions,
the latter effect dominates the former, such that having a smaller group
size results in hung juries more frequently than having a larger group.
This explains the hung-jury paradox. In the presence of an informational
cascade, unanimity can be more easily reached in a larger jury.
The presence of informational cascades may, therefore, explain why
the adoption of smaller juries has not substantially reduced mistrial rates.
The point we make is intuitively plausible: as jury size increases, the
potential for divergent beliefs to result in a hung jury goes up, but at
the same time, if judgments are expressed sequentially, jurors can adjust
their judgments in light of what others have expressed and an informational cascade may be triggered. As a result, an increase in jury size
increases the likelihood that by the time a dissenting juror is called to
express her judgments, her voting preference will have changed in response to the judgments previously expressed by other jurors. Hence,
the probability of a unanimous deliberation may increase with jury size.
Unanimity is more likely to be achieved in larger juries if jurors are
sufficiently open to the opinions of the other jurors. In other words, the
majority of jurors should be able to persuade dissenting minorities of
jurors and contaminate beliefs across the group to reach a common
judgment. Analytically, this requires that the self-confidence parameter,
18. Note that such a result is symmetric: it also applies to the probability of convergence
toward the wrong decision; that is, P(X1 p 0, . . . , Xn p 0) p 1.
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Figure 1. Unanimity with informational cascades

ai, which measures the weight assigned by each juror to his or her own
opinion, be decreasing as the number of other jurors expressing an opinion grows.19 As a consequence of proposition 3.1, the effect of jury size
on the probability of a hung jury is reduced and possibly even reversed
by informational cascades. These points are illustrated in Figures 1 and
2.
Figure 1 shows how the probability of reaching a unanimous verdict
19. Analytically, the persuasiveness (or openness) of jurors is measured as the speed of
the informational cascade, that is, the speed at which ai values decrease during the decisionmaking process. Proposition 3.1 requires a condition of asymptotic dominance on the
sequence of ai values to generate the hung-jury paradox. Asymptotic dominance can be
interpreted as the speed at which the sequence of ai values decreases during the deliberation
process and can be used as a proxy for the convincibility of jurors. Analytically, P(n)
approaches one for sufficiently large n values when ai values decrease such that
n
2
ip1 ai(1 ⫺ pi) p o(exp ⫺n ). See equation (A5) for the sufficient condition for the hungjury paradox theorem to hold.

写
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Figure 2. Right versus wrong verdicts

changes with jury size.20 The plotted lines in Figure 1 show the different
dynamics of unanimous decision making for four speeds of informational
cascade. Trivially, unanimity is certain in the case of a single juror. As
we can see in Figure 1, the probability of unanimity initially decreases
for sufficiently small juries (for any speed of informational cascade and
n 1 1). In the initial range, when the size of the jury grows above 1 but
remains sufficiently small, the jury size effect dominates, and unanimity
becomes more difficult to achieve as the number of jurors increases.
However, as n continues to increase, the probability of unanimity may
start to increase, depending on the speed of informational cascades. As
predicted by proposition 3.1, in the upper two curves of Figure 1 (representing higher speeds of informational cascade), as the jury grows
20. We illustrate the probability of a unanimous verdict as a function of jury size n in
Figure 1. We consider a jury size of up to n p 20 for illustrative purposes only, that is, to
show how the probability of unanimity changes with n because of the cascade effect versus
the jury size effect.
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larger, we start observing the cascade effect, which mitigates and ultimately dominates the jury size effect. With jury polarization, the probability of unanimity might, therefore, be at its lowest with small juries,
as is shown in Figure 1. The U-shaped plotting of the probability of a
unanimous decision in Figure 1 captures the nonlinear trade-offs between
jury size and cascade decision making. As the speed of informational
cascade increases, the convergence toward unanimity is accelerated because of the process of contamination.
It is worth noting that proposition 3.1 bears on whether the contamination process leads jurors to converge toward the right or the wrong
decision. The contamination process introduces drift, which may theoretically cause even large juries to converge around a wrong decision.
Figure 2 disaggregates the probability of unanimity into two components: the probability of reaching a unanimous correct verdict and the
probability of reaching a unanimous wrong verdict. Figure 2 shows the
dynamics of these two components as a function of jury size, illustrating
that the probability of a unanimous correct verdict dominates when the
value of n is sufficiently large. This is a reassuring result—cascade behavior is much more likely to foster consensus toward a correct verdict
than toward a wrong verdict. These results provide a tentative answer
to the concerns raised by Sunstein (2000) regarding the possible polluting
effect of cascade decision making in group deliberations. Informational
cascades in sufficiently large juries foster consensus toward correct unanimous verdicts. The wedge between the upper and lower plotted lines
in Figure 2 indicates that even for moderately sized juries, correct cascades far outnumber wrong cascades. Obviously, the extent to which
even a minimal increase in the probability of wrongful convictions may
be tolerated in the interest of procedural economy and sound convictions
is a question that falls beyond the scope of the present study.21 Our
results, however, suggest that this delicate trade-off, although relevant
qualitatively, is quantitatively scaled in favor of unanimous correct decision making, as long as the standard assumptions of p 1 .5 (that is,
jurors are more likely to decide correctly than mistakenly) is satisfied.
Hence, cascade decision making can reduce the cost of mistrials while
imposing little or no increase in the rate of wrongful convictions.
Our analysis has shown that informational cascades can increase the
probability of reaching a correct unanimous decision while decreasing
21. For recent literature on the Blackstonian ratio problems, see Rizzolli and Saraceno
(2013).
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the probability of a mistrial. This result seems to run against the established view in the literature. Nitzan and Paroush (1984) show that interdependent decision making (of which informational cascades are a
special case) reduces the probability of a correct jury verdict. When the
optimal voting rule is adopted, the institutional design of group decision
making should, therefore, favor independence among decision makers.
However, Nitzan and Paroush (1984) rely on the premise that the optimal voting rule is adopted.22 Unanimity is not the optimal decision
rule,23 and our result is therefore consistent with the results of Nitzan
and Paroush (1984) inasmuch as it shows that when the decision rule
is not optimal, interdependence is not necessarily harmful. Put more
simply, informational cascades can be desirable under a unanimity rule,
given the fact that unanimity is not the optimal decision rule.24
3.2. Hung-Jury Paradox: Jury Size and Heterogeneity

In Ballew v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of juries being both heterogeneous and representative of their communities. In particular, the Court ruled that heterogeneity is of utmost concern when jurisdictions opt to employ smaller juries. This decision reflects the conventional wisdom expressed in Sunstein (2002, p. 4) that
“homogeneity can be breeding grounds for unjustified extremism, even
fanaticism. To work well, deliberating groups should be appropriately
heterogeneous and should contain a plurality of articulate people with
reasonable views—an observation with implications for the design of
regulatory commissions, legislative committees, White House working
groups, and even multimember courts.”
In jury deliberation, heterogeneity matters to the extent that jurors
will have differing views on the case. In the determination of criminal
liability, the differing views of jurors may entail divergent probabilities

22. Nitzan and Paroush (1984) characterize the optimal voting rule (defined as the one
that maximizes the probability of the correct collective decision) as when the jury is faced
with a dichotomous choice in the presence of interdependent juror decisions.
23. The optimal decision rule is a weighted majority rule in which weights are the
logarithms of individual odds ratios of identifying the correct alternative. Note that the
unanimity rule is suboptimal in the presence of strategic voting (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
24. The optimality of the decision rule (either unanimity or a qualified majority) is highly
sensitive to small changes in jury size, as Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (2001) point out.
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of achieving a correct verdict, as well as divergent probabilities of achieving a unanimous verdict.25
We show that it is not always the case that a heterogeneous jury is
more likely to reach a correct unanimous decision than a same-sized
homogeneous jury. The reason, we discover, is that heterogeneity slows
the process of contamination through the cascade. On reflection, we find
that this result has much intuitive appeal. The more divergent jurors are
in their initial impressions of the evidence, the less likely we suspect they
will be to adopt herding behavior during deliberation.
Analytically, we model a heterogeneous jury of n jurors as consisting
of k subgroups of individuals, of sizes n 1 , . . . , nk, such that n 1 ⫹
… ⫹ n p n. Within each subgroup i, the jurors have equal abilities (that
k
is, probabilities of reaching a correct decision, pi) and equal selfconfidence (measured by the same ai). Hence, when jurors are called to
deliberate, each juror’s confidence is reinforced by the agreement of his
or her subgroup (assuming ni 1 1) and may be challenged by jurors in
different subgroups (assuming k 1 1 ). In the deliberation process, there
is no mitigation of juror self-confidence until a member of a different
subgroup presents a position.26 Armed with this qualitatively precise
characterization of heterogeneity, we are now able to deepen our understanding of the effects of heterogeneity on jury deliberation and to
give an analytical framing of the Court’s holding in Ballew v. Georgia.27
Proposition 3.2: Jury Size and Heterogeneity. The effect of heterogeneity on dissenting jurors can be more easily mitigated by informational cascades in larger juries than in smaller juries.28
Proof.

See the Appendix.

In heterogenous juries, the contamination process will slow the more
diverse that subgroups are from one another—persuasion efforts may
end in gridlock. More gridlock entails a higher (possibly excessive) rate
of mistrials and a lower probability of reaching a correct unanimous
25. The discussion of the model therefore uses interchangeably the terms “abilities” and
“probabilities of coming to a correct decision” as proxies for the different views held by
the heterogeneous jurors.
26. Note that a homogeneous jury is simply a heterogeneous jury possessing only one
subgroup in which all the members have the same ability, p*, and self-confidence, a*.
27. Our results merely offer a positive analysis of the Court’s holding in Ballew v.
Georgia. Assuredly, there is no evidence that the Court conducted the analysis that we
present here in reaching its decision.
28. The threshold at which heterogeneity ceases to produce correct verdicts is a*(1 ⫺
p*) 1 1 ⫺ c exp {⫺KL}. See the Appendix for an explanation and a proof.
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verdict. When we consider the relationship between jury size (n) and the
number of subgroups (k), it becomes apparent that when jurors are open
to each other’s ideas, a higher degree of jury heterogeneity is sustainable
and, indeed, desirable. As informational cascades weaken in response
to a reduction in jury size, heightened levels of heterogeneity are more
likely to result in deadlock and lower rates of correct unanimous verdicts.
Dissenting jurors may balkanize if the number of other jurors is not
large enough to trigger a change in the views of the dissenting subgroup.
The lesson to be learned here is that diversity is desirable in juries to
promote sound and balanced deliberation, if differences of opinion provoke an exchange of ideas and debate, leading to a convergence of views.
The value of heterogeneity hinges on the presence of persuasion, which
allows the members of a diverse group to reach a consensus despite their
initial differences. However, absent amenability to persuasion through
large-group informational cascades, heterogeneity could actually render
consensus among jurors more difficult to reach in small juries.29
4 . C O N CL U S I O N S

It is difficult to imagine jury deliberations free from the problem of
sequential decision making. Jurors form voting preferences on the basis
of both their private information and the preferences expressed by other
jurors. When jurors have little information on a subject, they instinctively
depend on the judgments of others. Thus, the process of jury deliberation
may engender consensus, but at the cost of potentially amplifying the
errors of some jurors, thereby leading to incorrect judgments.
In this paper, we considered the aggregation of information in a jury
in the presence of informational cascades. We examined the validity of
Condorcet’s jury theorem in situations in which informational cascades
are likely to occur and discovered that in the presence of informational
cascades, unanimity can be reached just as easily in a jury of 12 as in
a jury of six. These results shed light on the empirical literature, which
thus far has failed to find any correlation between jury size and mistrial
rates. By recognizing the countervailing effects of informational cascades
and heterogeneity, our more nuanced model improves on the simple
probabilistic prediction and thus explains the empirical data.
29. Hannaford-Agor et al. (2002) identify higher hung-jury rates in those jurisdictions
characterized by higher heterogeneity. For example, the authors estimate hung-jury rates
of around 9.5 percent in Washington, D.C., and the New York area but around 15 percent
in Los Angeles.
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Our results provide a natural stepping stone toward a normative
analysis of optimal jury size and optimal decision rules in the presence
of informational cascades. In this paper, we focused our attention on
the relationship between the probability of a hung jury and jury size,
without investigating the possibility of simultaneously changing the decision rule. The specific focus of our paper was dictated by the principles
set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Burch v. Louisiana (441 U.S. 130
[1979]), which holds that state courts are free to reduce jury size or to
modify the decision rule but not both: under current U.S. law, states
cannot allow smaller juries to decide nonunanimously. Future extensions
of our analysis should consider the impact of informational cascades on
the choice of the optimal decision rule, as well as the impact of various
procedural and evidentiary rules on jury deliberation with behavioral
cascades.
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A P P EN D IX

Table A1. States That Reduced Jury Sizes Only for Misdemeanor Offenses

Jurisdiction
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Texas
Virginia
West Virginia
Wyoming

Type of Case
Cases at the district level
By agreement
By agreement
All misdemeanors
All misdemeanors
Crimes punishable by a sentence of less than 6 months
All misdemeanors
All simple misdemeanors
Cases at the district level
Cases at district, probate, and municipal levels
All misdemeanors
All misdemeanors
By agreement if tried before an associate judge
Cases at the city, municipal, or justice of peace level
Cases at the county level
Cases at the justice court level
All misdemeanors
Cases at the magistrate and metropolitan levels
Cases at the district and city levels
Class A misdemeanors
All misdemeanors
All misdemeanors
All misdemeanors
By agreement
Cases at the magistrate and municipal levels
All misdemeanors
All misdemeanors
Cases at the magistrate level
All misdemeanors

Jurors
6
!12
!12

6
6
!12
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
8
6
6
6
6
6
7
6
6

Note. In Iowa, 12-person juries are required for serious or aggravated misdemeanors (Iowa
Const. art. I, sec. 9). In North Dakota, the defendant can make a motion for a 12-person
jury (N.D. Code 29-17-12).

Proof of Proposition 3.1

Assume that n p 2. The probability that the first two jurors make the
right decision is
P(Sn p 2) p P(X1 p 1, X 2 p 1)
p P(X 2 p 1FX1 p 1)P(X1 p 1) p [a 2 p2 ⫹ (1 ⫺ a 2 )]p1.
The second expression follows from the fact that we are conditioning
on the event X1 p 1. In case of unanimity,
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冘
i

kp1

Xk p i.

Thus, for any n 1 2, using the chain rule for conditional probabilities,
one can compute
P(Sn p n) p P(X1 p 1, . . . , Xn p 1)
p P(Xn p 1FX1 p 1, . . . , Xn⫺1 p 1) # … # P(X1 p 1)

写

(A1)

n

p

[a i pi ⫹ (1 ⫺ a i)].

ip1

If there is no cascade, a i p 1 for all i ≥ 2, and equation (A2) simplifies
to the following expression:

写
n

P(Sn p n) p

pi .

(A2)

ip1

The probability of unanimity in the presence of cascades in equation
(A2) is greater than the probability of unanimity in the absence of cascades in equation (A3), when a i pi ⫹ (1 ⫺ a i) 1 pi is satisfied for all i 苸
1, . . . , n. This is verified under the assumptions of the model.
In addition, proposition 3.1 requires us to verify that

写
n

写
n

[1 ⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)]
i ⫹

ip1

a i(1 ⫺ p)i r 1.

(A3)

ip1

Let

写
n

c(n) p

a i(1 ⫺ p).
i

ip1

Suppose that a i and (1 ⫺ p)i are such that a i(1 ⫺ p)/[1
⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)]
p
i
i
o(r i) for some 0 ! r ! 1. As the value of n gets larger, the ratio of the
two terms in equation (A4) is asymptotically equivalent to c(n)/[1 ⫺
c(n)]. It can be verified that

冘
n

ip1

冘
n

log

a i(1 ⫺ p)i
n(n ⫹ 1)
p
i log r p
log r.
1 ⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)i
2
ip1

From this equality, it follows that

写
n

ip1

写
n

[1 ⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)]/
i

a i(1 ⫺ p)i

ip1

is asymptotically equivalent to c(n)/[1 ⫺ c(n)] if and only if
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{1 ⫹expexp[n(n[n(n⫹⫹1)1)loglogr/2]r/2]} p o (exp ⫺n ) ,
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(A4)

which implies the desired result in equation (A4). Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 3.2

Let ai and pi, i p 1, . . . , k, denote the parameters for each of the
subgroups. Let c p 冘 i pi /k denote the ability of the average juror in the
heterogeneous jury.
We use the Kullback-Leibler distance between distribution (p1 / 冘 i pi,
. . . , pk / 冘 i pi) and distribution (n 1 /n, . . . , nk /n), denoted as KL:
KL p

冘[
i

]

ni
n
p
log i ⫺ log i .
n
n
冘 pi
i

Let p* and pi be the probability of a correct decision in a homogeneous jury and in subgroup i of the heterogeneous jury, respectively. The
probability that the homogeneous group deliberates correctly is larger
than that of the heterogeneous group if and only if

写
k

[1 ⫺ a*(1 ⫺ p)*]n ≥

ni
[1 ⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)]
.
i

ip1

Furthermore,
⫺

冘
i

冘
冘
冘

ni
log [1 ⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)]
p⫺
i
n
⫹

≤⫺

i

ni
log [1 ⫺ a i(1 ⫺ p)]
i
n

ni
n
log i ⫺
n
n

i

i

⫺ log

冘
i

ni
n
log i
n
n

ni
log pi ⫹ log
n

冘 冘
冘

≤ KL ⫺

pi ⫹

i

i

i

冘
i

ni
n
log i ⫺
n
n

1
1
log ⫺ log
k
k

≤ KL ⫺ log

冘p
i

k

i

pi

冘
i

冘
i

ni
n
log i
n
n

pi

,

where KL represents the Kullback-Leibler distance between distributions
(p1 , . . . , pn ) and (n 1 /n, . . . , nk /n) and the last two lines follow from
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the fact that the uniform distribution over k outcomes (1/k, . . . ,
1/k) has maximum entropy. The inequality is equivalent to a*(1 ⫺
p*) 1 1 ⫺ c exp {⫺KL}. This expression provides the sufficient condition
for the homogeneous jury to deliberate correctly with a higher probability than for the heterogeneous jury. By inspection of this condition,
it follows that any given level of heterogeneity is more problematic in
terms of achieving a unanimous decision for a smaller n value. Q.E.D.
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